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There is a myriad of things to like about Rik Peels’ book Responsible Belief: A 
theory in Ethics and Epistemology, but for me its stand out feature is the clarity, 
thoroughness, and care that the writing always displays. Peels’ prose never 
contains a word out of place, and embodies a palpable kind of intellectual 
conscientiousness, itself an implicitly impressive model and standard for the 
sort of intellectual ethics that Peels explicitly begins to articulate in this book. 
The book tackles a large number of fascinating issues more or less centred on 
the sub-field which has come to be known as ‘the Ethics of Belief’. I would 
like to focus, in this short piece, on Peel’s treatment of one of the most 
foundational issues of that sub-field – the issue of what belief is.  
 
Peels tells us that among the reasons for why we ought to investigate that 
issue is that, as he hopes to show, “a plausible analysis of belief also sheds 
light on suspension of judgement” (Peels 2016, p. 30). And, he thinks, 
correctly in my view, that a good account of our ethics of belief should be 
concerned with suspension of judgement qua doxastic attitude, since we can 
not only be blamed for our beliefs and disbeliefs, but also for our errant 
suspensions of judgement. As he puts it, “sometimes, we think that someone 
is blameworthy for suspending judgement, for instance, because she has not 
informed herself as while she should have done” (Peels 2016, p. 30). 
Importantly, however, and this is a point that Peels does not raise, it is not 
sufficient for phi-ing to be an indispensible subject matter for the ethics of 
belief that we can be blameworthy for phi-ing. Ethics simpliciter is about all 
things blameworthy (inter alia), the ethics of belief is about our blameworthy 
doxastic attitudes. The reason then that the Ethics of Belief ought to account 
for suspension of judgement is that the latter is a doxastic attitude. My overall 
concern, as we shall see, is that I do not think that under Peel’s analysis can 
we explain why suspension of judgment belongs to the same genus as belief.  
 
I agree with Peels as regards the idea that we need an alternative to the two 
major accounts of the metaphysics of belief, what we can broadly call an 
‘occurentist’ account and a ‘dispositionalist’ account. Roughly, according to 
an occurentist account to believe a proposition is to have some sort of 
representation of the world somehow ‘occur’ in one’s mind – Peels uses the 
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locution ‘thinks that p’.1  According to dispositionalist accounts to believe a 
proposition is to bear certain dispositional properties, usually to do with 
certain relevant actions. Both accounts are known to face real difficulties: it is 
hard to see how under the ‘occurentist’ account we can make sense of the idea 
that we can sensibly say of someone who is sleeping at t, that they believe that 
Paris is the Capital of France at t (so while they are not at t ‘thinking’ that 
Paris is the Capital of France). And it is hard to see how under the 
‘dispositionalist’ account we can make sense of the idea that we do not have 
an infinite number of beliefs at any one time – since there are an infinite 
number of things that someone would assent to if asked: e.g. that 12 is greater 
that 11, that 13 is greater that 12, that 14 is greater than 13… and so on and so 
forth. 
 
There is a third alternative account of what belief is that Peels does not 
discuss – an account sometimes known as a ‘pragmatist’ or ‘neo-
Wittensteinian’ view.  According to this view, roughly, S believes that p just 
in case the assigning of a belief that p is the best explanation of S’s actions and 
dispositions to action (both ‘internal’ and ‘external’).  Importantly, the 
account seems to evade the issues above (prima facie, at least). This is because 
assigning an infinite number of beliefs to someone would surely always be 
surplus to requirements in an explanation of anyone’s set of actions, and the 
account allows you to claim that you believe that p at t while you are sleeping 
at t. So this does look to me – at least at first blush – like an alternative worth 
considering. However, it does face issues; for instance, it seems to imply that 
we can believe at will, where most people writing on the issue seem to think 
that we cannot  (cf. Hedden 2015). I think these issues can be addressed in a 
refined, and modified account. but I am not going to discuss how here, since 
my aim is merely to point out that there is a viable theory of the metaphysics 
of belief that Peels does not address.  
 
I mention this third alternative not merely to score a cheap point, but because 
Peels’ account of doxastic metaphysics seems to trade on there being a 
stalemate in the current dialectic on the metaphysics of belief where a choice 
has to be made between occurentism and dispositionalism, and where each 
way of making the choice comes at considerable theoretical cost. Peels’ 
suggested way out of this impasse is to present an account where one does 
not have to make the relevant choice. He does this by resisting the 
assumption that ‘belief’ is a univocal term, or, thought of differently, that 
there really is only one primary species of belief, such that we will need only 
one theory to fully describe its metaphysics.  Peels proposes that ‘belief’ is 
polysemous, and that there are different species of belief – what he calls: 
occurent belief, tacit belief, and dispositional belief. The trick is to use the very                                                         
1 Though one may legitimately complain that an account according to which one 
beliefs that p iff one  ‘thinks that p’ is not very informative, since someone who 
wants to know what it is to believe that p, I conjecture, is likely also to want to know 
what ‘thinks that p’ involves.  
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motivations that underscore any given univocal theory of the metaphysics of 
belief x to instead motivate the thought that there is a doxastic feature y 
motivating x such that bearers of y constitute a discrete species within the 
genus ‘belief’. As such we do not have to make a choice between occurent and 
dispositional theories of belief – we just have to accept instead that there are 
different species of belief, each germane to a different analysis.  
 
So, we get Peels’ respective analyses of the three species of belief: 
 
OB: S occurently believes that p at some time t iff S at t considers p and 
thinks at t that p. (Peels 2017, p. 31). 
 
DB’’ S dormantly believes that p at t iff (i) S at t does not consider 
whether p, (ii) the last time t* at which S considered whether p, S 
thought that p, and (iii) at any time from t* and t, if S were to consider 
whether p, S would normally think that p. “(Peels 2017, p. 37). 
 
TB’’ S tacitly believes that p at t iff (i) S at t does not occurently or 
dormantly believe that p, (ii) from S’s perspective, p obviously follows 
from propositions that S occurently or dormantly believes at t, and (iii) 
if S at t were to consider whether p, S would normally think that p. 
(Peels 2017, p. 37). 
 
Peels calls his overall account a “Combination Account” of belief because it 
spells out “dormant and tacit belief in terms of both obvious entailment and 
certain dispositions” (Peels 2017 p. 37). The account is made particularly 
plausible, it seems to me, due to Peels’ making a distinction between dormant 
and tacit belief – since there is more to non-occurent belief than being mere 
dispositional belief.  That is, non-occurent belief comes in the tacit and 
dormant varieties. This means that Peels’ account looks to be more than a 
mere variant of a position Eric Schwitzgebel has called ‘liberal 
dispositionalism’ (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2002), according to which ‘silently 
uttering to oneself that p’ at relevant time counts among the possible actions 
relevant to the ascription of belief that p (and so the position is compatible 
with the failure of behaviourism, hence ‘liberal’).  
 
He does not seem to mention it, but in his “Combination Account” Peels also 
analyses dormant and tacit belief in part in terms of occurent belief, but, 
crucially, occurent belief is not spelled out in terms of either dispositions or 
obvious entailments. But though dormant, tacit, and occurent belief are meant 
to be different species, they are nonetheless supposed to belong to the same 
genus. In order for the analysis to be a combination analysis, and not merely a 
list of different analyses, it is important that occurent beliefs, tacit beliefs and 
dispositional beliefs are beliefs – or, at least, doxastic attitudes more broadly 
(which encompass suspensions of judgement too).  
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Peels does not however tell us what he thinks it is that makes each of 
dormant, tacit, and occurent beliefs doxastic (belonging to the genus belief). 
Since the analysis of occurent belief features in the definition of all three, it 
seems natural to surmise that under Peel’s combination account something 
cannot be a properly doxastic without involving occurent belief (construed as 
‘thinking that p’) at least counterfactually. In other words what seems to 
make something doxastic is the following: 
 
Meta-Combination:  A mental state α is a belief iff  “thinking that p” is  
involved either materially or counterfactually in the 
analysis of α.  
 
According to what I am calling Meta-Combination, one cannot have either an 
occurent, or dormant, or tacit belief if – under specified conditions – one does 
not think that p.  
  
But now take Peels’ analysis of suspension of judgement: 
 
The Combination Account that I have defended also provides us with 
the material to construe a plausible account of suspension of 
judgement. For we can now say that one suspends judgement on p if, 
roughly, one has considered p or p obviously follows from propositions 
that one has considered, and one neither believes nor disbelieves that 
p. (Peels 2016, p. 42). 
 
What is it that makes suspension of judgement doxastic? Given Peels’ tacit 
acceptance of Meta-Combination, we might expect that he holds that when 
suspension of judgement is a doxastic attitude because when one suspends 
that p, one thinks that p under certain circumstances specified by Peels’ 
account of suspension of judgement. But do we find any such conditions in 
Peel’s definition above? No, we do not. In fact, that we cannot find such 
conditions seems a consequence of the account making it the case that “belief 
and suspension are mutually exclusive” (Peels 2016, p. 42). 
 
But this seems to pull the rug from under Peels as regards his account of what 
makes the Combination Account attractive from the perspective of someone 
who is solely interested in the Ethics of Belief. And, further, since suspension no 
longer looks like a doxastic attitude, it makes it look inexplicable how 
suspension of judgement can replace belief, as per the natural locution: ” I 
used to believe Peel’s Combination account of belief, but having thought 
about it some more, I now suspend judgement on whether it is true.”  
 
And, relatedly, I think this makes trouble for Peels’ answer to the following 
objection, raised by Peels himself: 
 
 5 
…one may object that TB’’ suffers from an embarrassment of riches, 
since it would follow that we have an infinite number of beliefs. This, 
once might think, conflicts with materialism: if we are material beings, 
then, given that we consist of a finite number of material entities, we 
cannot have  an infinite number of beliefs. (Peels 2016, p. 41).  
 
Peels responds briefly by first noting that dispositionalist accounts of belief 
face the same issue. And then with the following: 
 
 Moreover the idea that we have an infinite number of beliefs conflicts  
with materialism only if we make several further controversial 
assumptions. Embracing both materialism and, for instance, 
functionalism – on which beliefs are certain functions (causal relations 
of the brain – is perfectly compatible with the claim that we have an 
infinite number of beliefs. (Peels 2016, p. 42).  
 
The problem with Peels’ response is that, first, the objection does not depend 
on the truth of materialism (as Peels himself notes, one could be a materialist 
and a functionalist, and so hold that we have an infinite number of beliefs). 
The “cognitive spread” objection (as it is sometimes known) is better thought 
of, I think, in terms of the idea that we are finite beings, and that as such we 
cannot be under an infinite number of obligations, if some version of ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ is the case.  If we had infinite beliefs then we would be subject to 
an infinite number of obligations – assuming the truth of idea that Peels seeks 
to defend: that we do have an ethics of belief. And note that we might even be 
immortal beings who are nonetheless finite, in the sense that we can only ever 
occupy limited space, and limited time.  
 
Second, it surely cannot be a point in favour of Peels’ combination account 
that dispositional (and other) theories of belief are vulnerable to the same 
objection, given that the account was meant to get us out of the situation 
where all the current theories of belief face insuperable problems.  
 
 
I think the last pair of objections are related to the previous one because they 
have to do with how we might expect the different parts of a combination 
account to work together to be better than the mere sum of their parts. In 
short, Peels’ combination account looks attractive because it promises to bring 
together the best aspects of the seemingly divergent theories of belief. It does 
so by disaggregating the sorts of things that motivate these theories such that 
they become relevant to separate species of belief. But in so doing, the account 
needs to tell us how these different species (including suspension of 
judgment) belong to the same genus. And, further, the different accounts – in 
combination – need to work together in the combination account to make the 
theory invulnerable to what the different accounts are individually vulnerable 
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to.  I have here aimed to show that Peels’ combination account struggles to 
meet these last two desiderata.  
 
Peels could respond with the rejoinder that he calls his account a 
‘combination account’ only because he analyses tacit and dormant belief in 
terms of both obvious entailments and dispositional properties. But the 
account has a combinatorial air, in that Peels also analyses tacit and dormant 
belief in terms of dispositions to ‘think that p’, viz. to have occurent belief (as 
per his analysis of the latter). And his ‘combination account’ is premised on 
the idea that there are different varieties of belief, each germane to a different 
analysis. My suspicion is that the more reason we have for thinking that this 
last idea is true, the more difficult it will be to give a unified account of what 
it is that makes doxastic attitudes doxastic, and so it will be difficult for us to 
talk meaningfully about an independent ethics of belief.  
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